Couzens Hoy (1989) on Michael Foucault, states that Foucault has provided the field concerning power with original analysis and a fascination for facts. Through his work, Foucault provides an analysis of the mechanics of power in themselves, that is the “way that power is exercised – concretely and in detail – with its specifity, its techniques and tactics (Foucault, in Gordon, 1980). Foucault has been classified as a post-structuralist, thus emphasizing that “language [i.e. discourse] is a self-subsisting if not a self-sufficient social entity” and that “there is more or less to words than meets the eye” (Marshall, 1998).
Power/ knowledge as a concept has been provided by Foucault who located the roots of knowledge in evolving relations of power (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). According to the idea of power/ knowledge, the concept of power constitutes knowledge in the sense that he/ she who has power is able to manage knowledge. Equally, the concept of knowledge constitutes power, in the sense that he/ she who has knowledge is able to exercise power (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Thus, according to Foucault the relationship between power and knowledge is not a cause-effect one. On the contrary, for Foucault the two concepts are intertwined and, hence, cannot be considered separable from one another (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).
Power is related to the influence of one individual onto another and, hence, the definition of power as the process through which: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do” (Dahl, 1957, cited in Fincham & Rhodes, 1992). Power can take the types of personalized power, that is “self-serving and used for personal gain, influence and advancement”; socialized power, that is “used for the common good on behalf of the whole organization” and it is, more or less, synonymous to authority, and; authority, that is “the right to guide or direct the actions of others and extract from them responses which are appropriate to the attainment of organizational goals” (Huczynski & Buchanan, 1997). However, besides these rather straight-forward definitions of power types, Foucault has introduced the concept of disciplinary power.
Through his work on criminality (in Discipline and Punishment, 1979), Foucault argues that the nature of power has changed over time. While in the past, the notion of sovereignty was considered the center of power and power practices, in later history, discipline is considered to be central concept according to the Foucauldian perspective. The basic difference between the two forms of power is that “whereas sovereign power was external, brutal and dramatic [i.e. public tortures, etc], disciplinary power is mundane and based on the surveillance of behaviour” (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992). Accordingly, arguing on the treatment and punishments of criminals, Foucault (in Gilbert, 2001) argues that “we may not be so visibly cruel as before, may no longer have public torture or executions, but we monitor, regulate and control behavior with a thoroughness that could not have been dreamed of in former times, both within prisons and in the wider populations”. In this sense, discipline is not the expression of power but “is constitutive of it” (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Disciplinary power is “insinuated in daily routines, it involves the meticulous observation of action and the penetration of regulation into the smallest details of everyday life” (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992). Thus, disciplinary power is instrumental in providing knowledge of the subject, through the “meticulous observation of action”, and the capacity to render ‘normalizing’ judgments, through the penetration of regulation into the smallest details of everyday life”. The notion of normalization is an important element of Foucault’s analysis. Through the process of normalization, standards and limits are established and based on these, powerful (often socially-constructed) structures order and define what is to be considered as normal. The standards and limits (i.e. ‘normality’) are imposed on the behaviour and actions of subjects, thus, discipline them, and, not surprisingly, actions and/ or behaviour that departs from the ‘normal’ is considered “deviant” and should, consequently, be disciplined (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).
Two further points must be stressed on the meticulous observation of action and its instrumentality in producing knowledge of the subject. Firstly, the meticulous observation of action is synonymous to the notion of ‘political anatomy’ where “power seeps into the very grain of individuals, reaches right into their bodies, permeates their gestures, their posture, what they say, how they live and learn to work with other people” (Foucault, 1977c, cited in McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). The delineation of the individual to such an extent renders the individual knowable/ measurable and, in consequence, controllable (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998; Townley, 1994, cited in Storey, 2001).
Secondly, the power/ control performed on the individual is insidious in nature as mentioned above (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Two characteristics of power and control are fundamental to the discussion of this insidiousness. Firstly, power and control must be visible and, secondly, unverifiable (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Bentham’s Panopticon (the ideal prison), “was a circular construction of open, single ‘cells’, built around a central inspection tower, by means of which both the inspector and the inmate where under constant surveillance” (Marshall, 1998). The power and control exercised were visible, that is “the inmate constantly [had] before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he was spied upon” and unverifiable, in the sense that “the inmate [should never] know whether he [was] being looked at any moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so” (Foucault, 1977, cited in McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Frequently associated with the study of the Panopticon, Foucault notes that through the visible and unverifiable nature of control and power exercised in the Panopticon, “individuals became ensnared in an impersonal power relation which both disindividualized the power relationship it self, and individualized those subjected to it (Marshall, 1998). In other words, power and control are not thought of as being exercised by a ruling class and the individual itself brings upon itself its own subjection to insidious power and control (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).
Foucault has illustrated his reasoning through disciplines such as psychiatry. Through the discourse of psychiatry (i.e. what psychiatry proclaims) one can define who is a “mental patient” or not. For Foucault the ability to define who is a mental patient constitutes knowledge deriving from the discourse of psychiatry. And since the discourse of psychiatry has the power to provide definitions, i.e. shape reality, it is synonymous to power (Couzens Hoy, 1989).
Discourse can, thus, contribute to all but truth. One example is the Holly Inquisition in the Medieval Age. Based on the discourse of religion, priests in the Medieval Age had the power to define who was a witch or not. What was proclaimed according to the discourse of religion constituted the knowledge of the time and its power was such that it led to what is defined as murder in contemporary society. It is important to note that discourse (in the case of the Medieval Age, religion) brought into being a class of people (the priests) and an institution (the church) that could exercise this new kind of power.
On the other hand, discourse can contribute to based-on-fact, realistic truth. According to Foucault (cited in Couzens Hoy, 1989) biology and linguistics are two discourses which contribute to objective reality. The two sciences have as their center and build upon notions that are incorruptible, e.g. forms of life and models of language accordingly.
Fincham R. and Rhodes P. S., 1992, “The Individual, Work and Organization: Behavioural Studies For Business and Management” 2nd ed., George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd, London
Couzens Hoy D., 1989, “Foucault: A Critical Reader”, Blackwell, Great Britain
Gilbert N., 2001, “Researching Social Life”, 2nd ed., Sage, Great Britain
Huczynski A. and Buchanan D., 1997, “Organizational Behaviour: An introductory text” 3rd ed., Prentice Hall, Europe.
Huczynski A. and Buchanan D., 2001, “Organizational Behaviour: An introductory text” 4th ed., Pearson Education Limited, England.
McKinlay A. and Starkey K., 1998, “Foucault, Management and the Organization Theory”, Sage, Great Britain
Storey J., 2001, “Human Resource Management: A critical Text”, 2nd ed., Thompson Learning, Great Britain
PS: Any ideas?
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