Audience: How is it that Woody Allen just gets better and better looking the older he gets?
Woody Allen: Well, it's nice of her to say that! Eh! You know, I probably started very bad when I was younger. And, anything that happens is registered as an improvement.
Directly quoted from 'TIME Interviews Woody Allen' on YouTube.
PS. Any ideas?
Tuesday, 16 September 2008
Thursday, 11 September 2008
Ambivalent points on the credit crunch
Credit crunch a year on: The winners
By Gavin Stamp
Business reporter, BBC News
The global credit crunch has caused anxiety and financial distress to millions. But as with any situation, there have been winners as well as losers.
US and European banks have had to turn to investors in the Middle East and Asia to repair their balance sheets, further strengthening the global economic clout and reach of China and the oil-rich Gulf states.
As consumers change their spending habits, certain businesses have reaped the rewards.
And while the financial turmoil has proved poison for policymakers dealing with it, it has provided rare meat for economists, commentators and opposition politicians.
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
State-controlled investment funds were a powerful force on the global business landscape long before the start of the credit crunch. But the cash crisis in the banking sector has accelerated the growth of so-called sovereign wealth funds, giving them an unprecedented opportunity to invest more of their colossal wealth in attractive corporate assets. Many of Wall Street's top names were grateful for injections of cash from sources that, not too long ago, they may have been somewhat wary of. The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) invested $6.8bn in Citigroup shares and bought a 9% stake in Swiss bank UBS while fellow Singaporean fund Temasek acquired a 10% stake in Merrill Lynch. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority invested $7.5bn in a stake in Citigroup while the Kuwait Investment Authority snapped up a $6.6bn holding in Merrill Lynch. The Gulf state of Qatar, via its Qatar Investment Authority, took a £1.7bn stake in Barclays. Chinese funding was also in demand with the China Investment Corporation - home to a fraction of China's vast foreign exchange reserves - shelling out $5.5bn to acquire a near 10% stake in Morgan Stanley. Bank bosses welcomed these investments as a vote of confidence in their businesses and the chance for valuable future partnerships in fast-growing regions.
But while many politicians backed this view, some worried about the political and economic repercussions of the shift in the balance of corporate power that this clearly represented. The European Union worried that state funds were not open enough about their affairs and called for them to follow new guidelines on governance and disclosure. The G8 group of leading industrial nations asked the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to look into how such funds conducted themselves, with the OECD concluding that there was no need for them to be regulated.
THE SUPER-RICH
It has become something of mantra that the credit crunch has affected everyone, whatever their level of income or assets. But it is undeniably true that some have felt it more than others. Anyone with cash savings has benefited and the larger the pile, the bigger the benefit. The super-rich are not insulated from falling property prices, bad investments and rising fuel costs, but evidence suggests they have weathered the storm better than most. According to Merrill Lynch, the ranks of the super-rich - defined as having more than $30m excluding the value of their homes - swelled 8% last year to more than 100,000. The combined wealth of millionaires, meanwhile, rose by more than 9% to $40.7 trillion, driven by a glut of new members in China, India and Brazil. This year will prove much tougher with fast-growing emerging economies vulnerable to the global slowdown, tight credit conditions and rising inflation.
But amid the prevailing gloom, there are signs individuals sitting on piles of cash are still prepared to spend it on prestigious investments. The annual sale of Old Masters paintings at Sotheby's generated £59.4m this year, 31% higher than 2007 and a 87% rise on the year before. Meanwhile, De Beers reports sales of rough diamonds are 10% ahead of last year while the owner of Cartier says jewellery sales rose 16% between April and June. Bookings at London's upmarket Dorchester Hotel have risen 12% in the past year.
VALUE PROVIDERS
While a minority may be cocooned from the effects of the credit crunch, most have been reviewing their expenditure and tightening their belts. Businesses able to provide value for money, both in terms of cheaper goods and ease of services have prospered. The popularity of "discount" supermarkets is a clear example of this. Their share of the UK grocery market has never been higher than now, with Aldi and Lidl enjoying annual sales growth of 19% and 14% respectively in June. The grocery sector is still growing strongly but customers seem to be "trading down" to cheaper stores as Waitrose and M&S see lower-than-average sales growth. McDonald's is creating 4,000 jobs in the UK after proclaiming itself more "recession resistant" than most retailers while the likes of Domino's Pizza have been busy as more people choose to order in rather than eat out. Other beneficiaries of the tougher economic climate include UK holiday operators such as Pontin's camps - whose bookings are up 10% - and public transport operators. As more repossessed homes go under the hammer, property auctioneers have also seen their fortunes improve. In its most recent auction last month, London auctioneer Andrews Robertson offered 215 properties for sale, up from 192 a year ago and 130 in July 2006. The fallback option provided by pawnbrokers is also proving increasingly attractive to people having to raise cash quickly. Industry estimates suggest the number of UK pawnbrokers is rising 10% a year and business is booming. One firm - H&T Group - saw profits jump more than 50% last year.
GLOOM MERCHANTS?
A financial crisis is rarely good for governments, particularly those that have been in power for a long time. The dramatic slide in Labour's popularity in the past year has neatly shadowed the global financial turmoil. In contrast, it has coincided with the revival of David Cameron's governing aspirations and the full emergence of Barack Obama as a political phenomenon. Opposition figures can make their name in a crisis and Lib Dem Treasury spokesman Vince Cable's dissection of Northern Rock's failings has won him widespread praise. Rarely off TV screens in recent months, it is apt that Mr Cable was once an economist, for they have also been among the winners from the credit crunch. In demand for their expertise and forecasting skills, they have gone a long way to proving that their calling is more of an important skill than a dismal science.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/7525181.stm
Published: 2008/08/05 23:27:15 GMT
© BBC MMVIII
PS: Any ideas?
Ambivalent points on the start of fear
I think my mother scared me when I was 3 months old. She said ‘boo’. It gave me the hiccups and she apparently must have been very satisfied. All mothers do it, you know! That’s how fear starts in everyone. Weren’t you ever booed at by your mother?
Alfred Hitchcock on the start of fear in an interview with Dick Cavett
PS. Any ideas?
Alfred Hitchcock on the start of fear in an interview with Dick Cavett
PS. Any ideas?
Ambivalent points on existence
What if everything is an illusion and nothing exists? In that case, I paid too much for that carpet.
Woody Allen
PS. Any ideas?
Woody Allen
PS. Any ideas?
Thursday, 10 July 2008
Ambivalent points on human nature
Raskolnikov smiled again. He realised all at once what the point was and where he was being led; he remembered his article. He decided to accept the challenge.
"This isn't quite how I have it," he began, simply and modestly. "I admit, however, that your summary is almost correct, even perfectly correct, if you like..."(It was as if he were pleased to agree that it was perfectly correct.)”The only difference is that I do not insist at all that extraordinary people absolutely must and are duty bound at all times to do all sorts of excesses, as you say. I even think that such an article would never be accepted for publication. I merely suggested that an 'extraordinary' man has the right...that is, not the official right, but his own right, to allow his conscience to...step over certain obstacles, and then only in the event that the fulfilment of his idea - sometime perhaps salutary for the whole of mankind - calls for it. You have been pleased to say that my article is unclear; I am prepared to clarify it for, as far as I can. I will perhaps not be mistaken in supposing that that seems to be just what you want. As you please, sir. In my opinion, if, as the result of certain combinations, Kepler's or Newton's discoveries could become known to people in no other way than by sacrificing the lives of one, or ten, or a hundred or more people who were hindering the discovery, or standing as an obstacle in its path, then Newton would have the right, and it would even be his duty...to remove those ten or a hundred people, in order to make his discoveries known to all mankind. it by no means follows from this, incidentally, that Newton should have the right to kill anyone he pleases, whomever happens along, or to steal from the market every day. Further, I recall developing in my article the idea that all...well, let's say, the lawgivers and founders of mankind, starting from the most ancient and going on to the Lycurguses, the Solons, the Muhamads, the Napoleons, and so forth, that all of them to a man were criminals, from the fact alone that in giving a new law they thereby violated the old one, held sacred by society and passed down from their fathers, and they certainly did not stop at shedding blood either, if it happened that blood (sometimes quite innocent and shed valiantly for the ancient law) could help them. it is even remarkable that most of these benefactors and founders of mankind were especially terrible blood-shedders. in short, I deduce that all, not only great men, but even those who are a tiny bit capable of saying something new - by their very nature cannot fail to be criminals - more or less to be sure. Otherwise it would be hard for them to get off the beaten track, and, of course, they cannot consent to stay on it, again by nature, and in my opinion it is even their duty not to consent. In short, you see that so far there is nothing especially new here. It has been printed and read a thousand times. As for my dividing people in ordinary and extraordinary, I agree that it is somewhat arbitrary, but I don't really insist on exact numbers. I only believe in my main idea. It consists precisely in people being divided generally, according to the law of nature, into two categories: a lower or, so to speak, material category (the ordinary), serving solely for the reproduction of their own kind: and people proper - that is those who have the gift or talent of speaking a new word in their environment. The subdivisions here are naturally endless, but the distinctive features of both categories are quite marked: people of the first, or material, category are by nature conservative, staid, live in obedience, and like being obedient. In my opinion they even must be obedient, because that is their purpose, and for them there is decidedly nothing humiliating in it. Those of the second category all transgress the law, are destroyers or inclined to destroy, depending on their abilities. The crimes of these people, naturally, are relative and variegated; for the most part they call, in quite diverse declarations, for the destruction of the present in the name of the better. But if such a one needs, for the sake of his idea, to step even over a dead body, over blood, then within himself, in his conscience, he can, in my opinion, allow himself to step over blood - depending, however, on the idea and its scale - make note of that. It is only in this sense that I speak in my article of their right to crime. (You recall we began with the legal question.) However, there's not much cause of alarm: the masses hardly ever acknowledge this right in them; they punish them and hang them (more or less), thereby quite rightly fulfilling their conservative purpose; yet, for all that, in subsequent generations these same masses place the punished ones on a pedestal and worship them (more or less). The first category is always master of the present; the second - master of the future. The first preserves the world and increases it numerically; the second moves the world and leads it towards a goal. Both the one and the other have perfectly equal right to exist."
Directly quoted from Crime and Punishment by Fyodor Dostoevsky (p.259-261: Vintage Classics)
PS: Any ideas?
"This isn't quite how I have it," he began, simply and modestly. "I admit, however, that your summary is almost correct, even perfectly correct, if you like..."(It was as if he were pleased to agree that it was perfectly correct.)”The only difference is that I do not insist at all that extraordinary people absolutely must and are duty bound at all times to do all sorts of excesses, as you say. I even think that such an article would never be accepted for publication. I merely suggested that an 'extraordinary' man has the right...that is, not the official right, but his own right, to allow his conscience to...step over certain obstacles, and then only in the event that the fulfilment of his idea - sometime perhaps salutary for the whole of mankind - calls for it. You have been pleased to say that my article is unclear; I am prepared to clarify it for, as far as I can. I will perhaps not be mistaken in supposing that that seems to be just what you want. As you please, sir. In my opinion, if, as the result of certain combinations, Kepler's or Newton's discoveries could become known to people in no other way than by sacrificing the lives of one, or ten, or a hundred or more people who were hindering the discovery, or standing as an obstacle in its path, then Newton would have the right, and it would even be his duty...to remove those ten or a hundred people, in order to make his discoveries known to all mankind. it by no means follows from this, incidentally, that Newton should have the right to kill anyone he pleases, whomever happens along, or to steal from the market every day. Further, I recall developing in my article the idea that all...well, let's say, the lawgivers and founders of mankind, starting from the most ancient and going on to the Lycurguses, the Solons, the Muhamads, the Napoleons, and so forth, that all of them to a man were criminals, from the fact alone that in giving a new law they thereby violated the old one, held sacred by society and passed down from their fathers, and they certainly did not stop at shedding blood either, if it happened that blood (sometimes quite innocent and shed valiantly for the ancient law) could help them. it is even remarkable that most of these benefactors and founders of mankind were especially terrible blood-shedders. in short, I deduce that all, not only great men, but even those who are a tiny bit capable of saying something new - by their very nature cannot fail to be criminals - more or less to be sure. Otherwise it would be hard for them to get off the beaten track, and, of course, they cannot consent to stay on it, again by nature, and in my opinion it is even their duty not to consent. In short, you see that so far there is nothing especially new here. It has been printed and read a thousand times. As for my dividing people in ordinary and extraordinary, I agree that it is somewhat arbitrary, but I don't really insist on exact numbers. I only believe in my main idea. It consists precisely in people being divided generally, according to the law of nature, into two categories: a lower or, so to speak, material category (the ordinary), serving solely for the reproduction of their own kind: and people proper - that is those who have the gift or talent of speaking a new word in their environment. The subdivisions here are naturally endless, but the distinctive features of both categories are quite marked: people of the first, or material, category are by nature conservative, staid, live in obedience, and like being obedient. In my opinion they even must be obedient, because that is their purpose, and for them there is decidedly nothing humiliating in it. Those of the second category all transgress the law, are destroyers or inclined to destroy, depending on their abilities. The crimes of these people, naturally, are relative and variegated; for the most part they call, in quite diverse declarations, for the destruction of the present in the name of the better. But if such a one needs, for the sake of his idea, to step even over a dead body, over blood, then within himself, in his conscience, he can, in my opinion, allow himself to step over blood - depending, however, on the idea and its scale - make note of that. It is only in this sense that I speak in my article of their right to crime. (You recall we began with the legal question.) However, there's not much cause of alarm: the masses hardly ever acknowledge this right in them; they punish them and hang them (more or less), thereby quite rightly fulfilling their conservative purpose; yet, for all that, in subsequent generations these same masses place the punished ones on a pedestal and worship them (more or less). The first category is always master of the present; the second - master of the future. The first preserves the world and increases it numerically; the second moves the world and leads it towards a goal. Both the one and the other have perfectly equal right to exist."
Directly quoted from Crime and Punishment by Fyodor Dostoevsky (p.259-261: Vintage Classics)
PS: Any ideas?
Wednesday, 9 July 2008
Ambivalent points between Foucault and Chomsky
C: Well, let me begin by referring to something that I have already discussed. If it is correct, as I believe it is, that a fundamental element of human nature is the need for creative work, for creative enquiry, for free creation without the arbitrary limiting effects of coercive institutions, then of course it will follow that a decent society should maximize the possibilities for this fundamental human characteristic to be realised. That means trying to overcome the elements of repression and oppression, and destruction and coercion that exist in any existing society, ours for example, as a historical residue. Now, a federated, decentralised system of free associations incorporating economic as well as social institutions would be what I refer to as an anarcho-syndicalism. And it seems to me that it is an appropriate form of social organization for an advanced technological society in which human beings do not have to be forced into the position of tools, of cogs in a machine in which the creative urge, that I think is intrinsic to human nature, will in fact be able to realise itself in whatever way it will. I don’t know all the ways in which it will.
F: my approach is far less advanced than Mr. Chomsky’s. I admit to not being able to define, nor for even stronger reasons to propose, an ideal social model for the functioning of our scientific or technological society. On the other hand, one of the most urgent tasks, before anything else, is that we are used to consider, at least in our European society, that power is in the hands of the government and is exerted by some particular institutions such as local governments, the police, the Army. These institutions transit the orders, apply them and punish people who don’t obey. But, I think that the political power is also exerted by a few other institutions which seem to have nothing in common with the political power, which seem to be independent but which actually aren’t. We all know the whole educational system that is supposed to distribute knowledge, we know that the educational system maintains the power in the hands of a certain social class and exclude the other social class from this power. Psychiatry for instance is also apparently meant to improve mankind and the knowledge of the psychiatrists. Psychiatry is also a way to implement a political power to a particular social group. Justice also. It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise and attack them in same manner that political violence has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them. If we want to define the profile and the formula of our future society, without criticizing all the forms of political power that are exerted in our society, there is a risk that they reconstitute themselves, even though such an apparently noble form of anarchist-unionism.
C: Yes, I would definitely agree with that, but not only in theory but also in action. That is, there are two intellectual tasks. One and the one that I was discussing to try to create the vision of a future just society. Another task is to understand very clearly the nature of power and oppression, and terror and destruction in our own society, and that certainly includes the institutions that you mentioned, as well as the central institutions of any industrial society, namely the economic, commercial and financial institutions. In particular, in the coming period, the great multinational corporations which are not very far from us physically tonight. These are the basic institutions of oppression and coercion and autocratic rule that appear to be neutral – after all they say that we are subject to the democracy of the marketplace – still I think it would be a great shame to loose, or to put aside entirely the somewhat more abstract and philosophical if you like task of trying to draw the connections between a concept of human nature that gives full scope to freedom and dignity and creativity and other fundamental human characteristics and relates that to some notion of social structure in which those properties could be realised and in which meaningful, human life could take place. And, in fact, if we are thinking of social transformation or social revolution – through it would be absurd of course to try to draw it out in detail the point that we are hoping to reach – still we should know something about where we think we are going.
F: Yes, but then isn’t there a danger here? If you say that a certain human nature exists, that this human nature has not been given in actual society the rights and the possibilities which allow it to realise itself – that’s really what you have said, I believe. And if one admits that, doesn’t one risk defining this human nature – which is at the same time ideal and real, and has been hidden and repressed until now – in terms borrowed from our society, from our civilization, from our culture? Is the notion of human nature - you acknowledge yourself that we don’t know exactly what human nature is – isn’t there a risk that we will be led in error? You know Mao Tse Toeng distinguished a bourgeois human nature and a proletarian human nature. For him it wasn’t the same thing.
C: Well, you see, I think, that in the intellectual domain of political action, that is the domain of trying to construct a vision of a just and free society on the basis of some notion of human nature, in that domain we face the very same problem that we face in immediate political action. For example to be quite concrete, a lot of my own activity has to do with the Vietnam war and a good deal of my energy goes into civil disobedience. Well, civil disobedience in the United States is an action undertaken in the face of considerable uncertainties about its effects. For example it threatens the social order in ways that which – one might argue – may bring on fascism. That would be very bad for America, for Vietnam, for Holland and for everyone else. So, there is a danger in undertaking this concrete act. On the other hand there is a great danger in not undertaking it. Namely if you don’t undertake it, the society of Indochina will be torn into shreds by the American power, and in the face of those uncertainties one has to chose a course of action. While similarly in the intellectual domain, one is faced with the uncertainties that you correctly posed. Our concept of the human nature is certainly limited, partial, socially conditioned and constrained by our own character defects and the limitations of the intellectual culture in which we exist. Yet at the same time it is of critical importance that we have some direction, that we know what impossible goals we are trying to achieve, if we hope to achieve some of the possible goals. And that means that we have to be bold enough to speculate and create social theories on the basis of partial knowledge while we remain very open to the strong possibility, in fact overwhelming probability, that in some respects we are very far off the mark.
[Break]
F: But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself, functions within a society of classes as a claim made by oppressed class and as justification for it.
C: I don’t agree with it.
F: and in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice.
C: Well, here I really disagree. I think that there is a sort of an absolute basis – if you press me too hard I will be in trouble because I cannot sketch it out – but some sort of an absolute basis ultimately residing in fundamental human qualities in terms of which a real notion of justice is grounded. And I think that our existing systems of justice – I think it is too hasty to characterise our existing systems of justice as merely systems of class oppression. I don’t think that they are that. I that they embody systems of class oppression and they embody elements of other kinds of oppression but they also embody a kind of groping towards the true humanly valuable concept of justice and decency and love and kindness and sympathy and so on, which I think are real.
F: Well, do I have time to answer? How much? [Two minutes] [All laugh] But I would say that that is unjust. No, but I don’t want to answer in so little time. I would say this. Contrary to what you think, you cant prevent me from believing that these notions of human nature, of justice, of the realization of the essence of the human being, are all notions and concepts which have been found within our civilization, within our type of knowledge and our form of philosophy, and that as a result form part of our class system; and one cant, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions to describe or justify a fight which should – and shall in principle – overthrow the very fundamentals of our society. This is an extrapolation for which I can’t find historical justification.
(Transcribed from an interview between the two men broadcasted on YouTube)
PS: Any ideas?
F: my approach is far less advanced than Mr. Chomsky’s. I admit to not being able to define, nor for even stronger reasons to propose, an ideal social model for the functioning of our scientific or technological society. On the other hand, one of the most urgent tasks, before anything else, is that we are used to consider, at least in our European society, that power is in the hands of the government and is exerted by some particular institutions such as local governments, the police, the Army. These institutions transit the orders, apply them and punish people who don’t obey. But, I think that the political power is also exerted by a few other institutions which seem to have nothing in common with the political power, which seem to be independent but which actually aren’t. We all know the whole educational system that is supposed to distribute knowledge, we know that the educational system maintains the power in the hands of a certain social class and exclude the other social class from this power. Psychiatry for instance is also apparently meant to improve mankind and the knowledge of the psychiatrists. Psychiatry is also a way to implement a political power to a particular social group. Justice also. It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise and attack them in same manner that political violence has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them. If we want to define the profile and the formula of our future society, without criticizing all the forms of political power that are exerted in our society, there is a risk that they reconstitute themselves, even though such an apparently noble form of anarchist-unionism.
C: Yes, I would definitely agree with that, but not only in theory but also in action. That is, there are two intellectual tasks. One and the one that I was discussing to try to create the vision of a future just society. Another task is to understand very clearly the nature of power and oppression, and terror and destruction in our own society, and that certainly includes the institutions that you mentioned, as well as the central institutions of any industrial society, namely the economic, commercial and financial institutions. In particular, in the coming period, the great multinational corporations which are not very far from us physically tonight. These are the basic institutions of oppression and coercion and autocratic rule that appear to be neutral – after all they say that we are subject to the democracy of the marketplace – still I think it would be a great shame to loose, or to put aside entirely the somewhat more abstract and philosophical if you like task of trying to draw the connections between a concept of human nature that gives full scope to freedom and dignity and creativity and other fundamental human characteristics and relates that to some notion of social structure in which those properties could be realised and in which meaningful, human life could take place. And, in fact, if we are thinking of social transformation or social revolution – through it would be absurd of course to try to draw it out in detail the point that we are hoping to reach – still we should know something about where we think we are going.
F: Yes, but then isn’t there a danger here? If you say that a certain human nature exists, that this human nature has not been given in actual society the rights and the possibilities which allow it to realise itself – that’s really what you have said, I believe. And if one admits that, doesn’t one risk defining this human nature – which is at the same time ideal and real, and has been hidden and repressed until now – in terms borrowed from our society, from our civilization, from our culture? Is the notion of human nature - you acknowledge yourself that we don’t know exactly what human nature is – isn’t there a risk that we will be led in error? You know Mao Tse Toeng distinguished a bourgeois human nature and a proletarian human nature. For him it wasn’t the same thing.
C: Well, you see, I think, that in the intellectual domain of political action, that is the domain of trying to construct a vision of a just and free society on the basis of some notion of human nature, in that domain we face the very same problem that we face in immediate political action. For example to be quite concrete, a lot of my own activity has to do with the Vietnam war and a good deal of my energy goes into civil disobedience. Well, civil disobedience in the United States is an action undertaken in the face of considerable uncertainties about its effects. For example it threatens the social order in ways that which – one might argue – may bring on fascism. That would be very bad for America, for Vietnam, for Holland and for everyone else. So, there is a danger in undertaking this concrete act. On the other hand there is a great danger in not undertaking it. Namely if you don’t undertake it, the society of Indochina will be torn into shreds by the American power, and in the face of those uncertainties one has to chose a course of action. While similarly in the intellectual domain, one is faced with the uncertainties that you correctly posed. Our concept of the human nature is certainly limited, partial, socially conditioned and constrained by our own character defects and the limitations of the intellectual culture in which we exist. Yet at the same time it is of critical importance that we have some direction, that we know what impossible goals we are trying to achieve, if we hope to achieve some of the possible goals. And that means that we have to be bold enough to speculate and create social theories on the basis of partial knowledge while we remain very open to the strong possibility, in fact overwhelming probability, that in some respects we are very far off the mark.
[Break]
F: But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself, functions within a society of classes as a claim made by oppressed class and as justification for it.
C: I don’t agree with it.
F: and in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice.
C: Well, here I really disagree. I think that there is a sort of an absolute basis – if you press me too hard I will be in trouble because I cannot sketch it out – but some sort of an absolute basis ultimately residing in fundamental human qualities in terms of which a real notion of justice is grounded. And I think that our existing systems of justice – I think it is too hasty to characterise our existing systems of justice as merely systems of class oppression. I don’t think that they are that. I that they embody systems of class oppression and they embody elements of other kinds of oppression but they also embody a kind of groping towards the true humanly valuable concept of justice and decency and love and kindness and sympathy and so on, which I think are real.
F: Well, do I have time to answer? How much? [Two minutes] [All laugh] But I would say that that is unjust. No, but I don’t want to answer in so little time. I would say this. Contrary to what you think, you cant prevent me from believing that these notions of human nature, of justice, of the realization of the essence of the human being, are all notions and concepts which have been found within our civilization, within our type of knowledge and our form of philosophy, and that as a result form part of our class system; and one cant, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions to describe or justify a fight which should – and shall in principle – overthrow the very fundamentals of our society. This is an extrapolation for which I can’t find historical justification.
(Transcribed from an interview between the two men broadcasted on YouTube)
PS: Any ideas?
Tuesday, 8 July 2008
Ambivalent points on power
Couzens Hoy (1989) on Michael Foucault, states that Foucault has provided the field concerning power with original analysis and a fascination for facts. Through his work, Foucault provides an analysis of the mechanics of power in themselves, that is the “way that power is exercised – concretely and in detail – with its specifity, its techniques and tactics (Foucault, in Gordon, 1980). Foucault has been classified as a post-structuralist, thus emphasizing that “language [i.e. discourse] is a self-subsisting if not a self-sufficient social entity” and that “there is more or less to words than meets the eye” (Marshall, 1998).
Power/ knowledge as a concept has been provided by Foucault who located the roots of knowledge in evolving relations of power (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). According to the idea of power/ knowledge, the concept of power constitutes knowledge in the sense that he/ she who has power is able to manage knowledge. Equally, the concept of knowledge constitutes power, in the sense that he/ she who has knowledge is able to exercise power (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Thus, according to Foucault the relationship between power and knowledge is not a cause-effect one. On the contrary, for Foucault the two concepts are intertwined and, hence, cannot be considered separable from one another (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).
Power is related to the influence of one individual onto another and, hence, the definition of power as the process through which: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do” (Dahl, 1957, cited in Fincham & Rhodes, 1992). Power can take the types of personalized power, that is “self-serving and used for personal gain, influence and advancement”; socialized power, that is “used for the common good on behalf of the whole organization” and it is, more or less, synonymous to authority, and; authority, that is “the right to guide or direct the actions of others and extract from them responses which are appropriate to the attainment of organizational goals” (Huczynski & Buchanan, 1997). However, besides these rather straight-forward definitions of power types, Foucault has introduced the concept of disciplinary power.
Through his work on criminality (in Discipline and Punishment, 1979), Foucault argues that the nature of power has changed over time. While in the past, the notion of sovereignty was considered the center of power and power practices, in later history, discipline is considered to be central concept according to the Foucauldian perspective. The basic difference between the two forms of power is that “whereas sovereign power was external, brutal and dramatic [i.e. public tortures, etc], disciplinary power is mundane and based on the surveillance of behaviour” (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992). Accordingly, arguing on the treatment and punishments of criminals, Foucault (in Gilbert, 2001) argues that “we may not be so visibly cruel as before, may no longer have public torture or executions, but we monitor, regulate and control behavior with a thoroughness that could not have been dreamed of in former times, both within prisons and in the wider populations”. In this sense, discipline is not the expression of power but “is constitutive of it” (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Disciplinary power is “insinuated in daily routines, it involves the meticulous observation of action and the penetration of regulation into the smallest details of everyday life” (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992). Thus, disciplinary power is instrumental in providing knowledge of the subject, through the “meticulous observation of action”, and the capacity to render ‘normalizing’ judgments, through the penetration of regulation into the smallest details of everyday life”. The notion of normalization is an important element of Foucault’s analysis. Through the process of normalization, standards and limits are established and based on these, powerful (often socially-constructed) structures order and define what is to be considered as normal. The standards and limits (i.e. ‘normality’) are imposed on the behaviour and actions of subjects, thus, discipline them, and, not surprisingly, actions and/ or behaviour that departs from the ‘normal’ is considered “deviant” and should, consequently, be disciplined (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).
Two further points must be stressed on the meticulous observation of action and its instrumentality in producing knowledge of the subject. Firstly, the meticulous observation of action is synonymous to the notion of ‘political anatomy’ where “power seeps into the very grain of individuals, reaches right into their bodies, permeates their gestures, their posture, what they say, how they live and learn to work with other people” (Foucault, 1977c, cited in McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). The delineation of the individual to such an extent renders the individual knowable/ measurable and, in consequence, controllable (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998; Townley, 1994, cited in Storey, 2001).
Secondly, the power/ control performed on the individual is insidious in nature as mentioned above (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Two characteristics of power and control are fundamental to the discussion of this insidiousness. Firstly, power and control must be visible and, secondly, unverifiable (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Bentham’s Panopticon (the ideal prison), “was a circular construction of open, single ‘cells’, built around a central inspection tower, by means of which both the inspector and the inmate where under constant surveillance” (Marshall, 1998). The power and control exercised were visible, that is “the inmate constantly [had] before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he was spied upon” and unverifiable, in the sense that “the inmate [should never] know whether he [was] being looked at any moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so” (Foucault, 1977, cited in McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Frequently associated with the study of the Panopticon, Foucault notes that through the visible and unverifiable nature of control and power exercised in the Panopticon, “individuals became ensnared in an impersonal power relation which both disindividualized the power relationship it self, and individualized those subjected to it (Marshall, 1998). In other words, power and control are not thought of as being exercised by a ruling class and the individual itself brings upon itself its own subjection to insidious power and control (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).
Foucault has illustrated his reasoning through disciplines such as psychiatry. Through the discourse of psychiatry (i.e. what psychiatry proclaims) one can define who is a “mental patient” or not. For Foucault the ability to define who is a mental patient constitutes knowledge deriving from the discourse of psychiatry. And since the discourse of psychiatry has the power to provide definitions, i.e. shape reality, it is synonymous to power (Couzens Hoy, 1989).
Discourse can, thus, contribute to all but truth. One example is the Holly Inquisition in the Medieval Age. Based on the discourse of religion, priests in the Medieval Age had the power to define who was a witch or not. What was proclaimed according to the discourse of religion constituted the knowledge of the time and its power was such that it led to what is defined as murder in contemporary society. It is important to note that discourse (in the case of the Medieval Age, religion) brought into being a class of people (the priests) and an institution (the church) that could exercise this new kind of power.
On the other hand, discourse can contribute to based-on-fact, realistic truth. According to Foucault (cited in Couzens Hoy, 1989) biology and linguistics are two discourses which contribute to objective reality. The two sciences have as their center and build upon notions that are incorruptible, e.g. forms of life and models of language accordingly.
Fincham R. and Rhodes P. S., 1992, “The Individual, Work and Organization: Behavioural Studies For Business and Management” 2nd ed., George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd, London
Couzens Hoy D., 1989, “Foucault: A Critical Reader”, Blackwell, Great Britain
Gilbert N., 2001, “Researching Social Life”, 2nd ed., Sage, Great Britain
Huczynski A. and Buchanan D., 1997, “Organizational Behaviour: An introductory text” 3rd ed., Prentice Hall, Europe.
Huczynski A. and Buchanan D., 2001, “Organizational Behaviour: An introductory text” 4th ed., Pearson Education Limited, England.
McKinlay A. and Starkey K., 1998, “Foucault, Management and the Organization Theory”, Sage, Great Britain
Storey J., 2001, “Human Resource Management: A critical Text”, 2nd ed., Thompson Learning, Great Britain
PS: Any ideas?
Power/ knowledge as a concept has been provided by Foucault who located the roots of knowledge in evolving relations of power (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). According to the idea of power/ knowledge, the concept of power constitutes knowledge in the sense that he/ she who has power is able to manage knowledge. Equally, the concept of knowledge constitutes power, in the sense that he/ she who has knowledge is able to exercise power (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Thus, according to Foucault the relationship between power and knowledge is not a cause-effect one. On the contrary, for Foucault the two concepts are intertwined and, hence, cannot be considered separable from one another (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).
Power is related to the influence of one individual onto another and, hence, the definition of power as the process through which: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do” (Dahl, 1957, cited in Fincham & Rhodes, 1992). Power can take the types of personalized power, that is “self-serving and used for personal gain, influence and advancement”; socialized power, that is “used for the common good on behalf of the whole organization” and it is, more or less, synonymous to authority, and; authority, that is “the right to guide or direct the actions of others and extract from them responses which are appropriate to the attainment of organizational goals” (Huczynski & Buchanan, 1997). However, besides these rather straight-forward definitions of power types, Foucault has introduced the concept of disciplinary power.
Through his work on criminality (in Discipline and Punishment, 1979), Foucault argues that the nature of power has changed over time. While in the past, the notion of sovereignty was considered the center of power and power practices, in later history, discipline is considered to be central concept according to the Foucauldian perspective. The basic difference between the two forms of power is that “whereas sovereign power was external, brutal and dramatic [i.e. public tortures, etc], disciplinary power is mundane and based on the surveillance of behaviour” (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992). Accordingly, arguing on the treatment and punishments of criminals, Foucault (in Gilbert, 2001) argues that “we may not be so visibly cruel as before, may no longer have public torture or executions, but we monitor, regulate and control behavior with a thoroughness that could not have been dreamed of in former times, both within prisons and in the wider populations”. In this sense, discipline is not the expression of power but “is constitutive of it” (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Disciplinary power is “insinuated in daily routines, it involves the meticulous observation of action and the penetration of regulation into the smallest details of everyday life” (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992). Thus, disciplinary power is instrumental in providing knowledge of the subject, through the “meticulous observation of action”, and the capacity to render ‘normalizing’ judgments, through the penetration of regulation into the smallest details of everyday life”. The notion of normalization is an important element of Foucault’s analysis. Through the process of normalization, standards and limits are established and based on these, powerful (often socially-constructed) structures order and define what is to be considered as normal. The standards and limits (i.e. ‘normality’) are imposed on the behaviour and actions of subjects, thus, discipline them, and, not surprisingly, actions and/ or behaviour that departs from the ‘normal’ is considered “deviant” and should, consequently, be disciplined (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).
Two further points must be stressed on the meticulous observation of action and its instrumentality in producing knowledge of the subject. Firstly, the meticulous observation of action is synonymous to the notion of ‘political anatomy’ where “power seeps into the very grain of individuals, reaches right into their bodies, permeates their gestures, their posture, what they say, how they live and learn to work with other people” (Foucault, 1977c, cited in McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). The delineation of the individual to such an extent renders the individual knowable/ measurable and, in consequence, controllable (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998; Townley, 1994, cited in Storey, 2001).
Secondly, the power/ control performed on the individual is insidious in nature as mentioned above (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Two characteristics of power and control are fundamental to the discussion of this insidiousness. Firstly, power and control must be visible and, secondly, unverifiable (McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Bentham’s Panopticon (the ideal prison), “was a circular construction of open, single ‘cells’, built around a central inspection tower, by means of which both the inspector and the inmate where under constant surveillance” (Marshall, 1998). The power and control exercised were visible, that is “the inmate constantly [had] before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he was spied upon” and unverifiable, in the sense that “the inmate [should never] know whether he [was] being looked at any moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so” (Foucault, 1977, cited in McKinlay & Starkey, 1998). Frequently associated with the study of the Panopticon, Foucault notes that through the visible and unverifiable nature of control and power exercised in the Panopticon, “individuals became ensnared in an impersonal power relation which both disindividualized the power relationship it self, and individualized those subjected to it (Marshall, 1998). In other words, power and control are not thought of as being exercised by a ruling class and the individual itself brings upon itself its own subjection to insidious power and control (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992; McKinlay & Starkey, 1998).
Foucault has illustrated his reasoning through disciplines such as psychiatry. Through the discourse of psychiatry (i.e. what psychiatry proclaims) one can define who is a “mental patient” or not. For Foucault the ability to define who is a mental patient constitutes knowledge deriving from the discourse of psychiatry. And since the discourse of psychiatry has the power to provide definitions, i.e. shape reality, it is synonymous to power (Couzens Hoy, 1989).
Discourse can, thus, contribute to all but truth. One example is the Holly Inquisition in the Medieval Age. Based on the discourse of religion, priests in the Medieval Age had the power to define who was a witch or not. What was proclaimed according to the discourse of religion constituted the knowledge of the time and its power was such that it led to what is defined as murder in contemporary society. It is important to note that discourse (in the case of the Medieval Age, religion) brought into being a class of people (the priests) and an institution (the church) that could exercise this new kind of power.
On the other hand, discourse can contribute to based-on-fact, realistic truth. According to Foucault (cited in Couzens Hoy, 1989) biology and linguistics are two discourses which contribute to objective reality. The two sciences have as their center and build upon notions that are incorruptible, e.g. forms of life and models of language accordingly.
Fincham R. and Rhodes P. S., 1992, “The Individual, Work and Organization: Behavioural Studies For Business and Management” 2nd ed., George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd, London
Couzens Hoy D., 1989, “Foucault: A Critical Reader”, Blackwell, Great Britain
Gilbert N., 2001, “Researching Social Life”, 2nd ed., Sage, Great Britain
Huczynski A. and Buchanan D., 1997, “Organizational Behaviour: An introductory text” 3rd ed., Prentice Hall, Europe.
Huczynski A. and Buchanan D., 2001, “Organizational Behaviour: An introductory text” 4th ed., Pearson Education Limited, England.
McKinlay A. and Starkey K., 1998, “Foucault, Management and the Organization Theory”, Sage, Great Britain
Storey J., 2001, “Human Resource Management: A critical Text”, 2nd ed., Thompson Learning, Great Britain
PS: Any ideas?
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